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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
V.
)
DIMITRY S. GONCHARUK,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

NO. 47128-2019
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR14-18-9129

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Dimitry Goncharuk appeals, asserting the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion for leniency under I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35 motion). He contends the
new or additional information he presented in support of his motion demonstrated that the
sentence was excessive as originally imposed. As such, this Court should either reduce his
sentence, or alternatively, vacate the order denying the Rule 35 motion and remand this case for
the district court to reduce his sentence.

1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Goncharuk was in the parking lot of an auto auction business when officers arrived to
investigate a report of a suspicious driver and that the person with it had been drinking alcohol.
(R., p.12 (affidavit in support of probable cause); PSI, p.3 (the "official version" as reported by
the presentence investigator); PSI, p.4 (Mr. Goncharuk's version of events, as reported by the
presentence investigator); PSI, pp.40-47 (police reports of the incident).) 1

During that

conversation, Mr. Goncharuk admitted his driver's license was suspended. (PSI, p.40.) The
officers told Mr. Goncharuk to leave the car where it was because of his suspended license and
because he had been drinking beer, and that he should either walk home or call a friend.
(R., p.12; PSI, pp.3, 40.)
The officers left the scene apparently without making any further investigation as to
whether Mr. Goncharuk was actually impaired or over the limit to drive. (See generally R., p.12;
PSI, pp.3-4, 40-47 (no indication that FSTs or breath tests were conducted at that time).) After
they left, another person asked Mr. Goncharuk to move his car so they could more easily tum a
truck around. (PSI, p.4; Tr., p.11, Ls.2-4.) Mr. Goncharuk moved his car to the other side of the
parking lot. (R., p.12; PSI, pp.3-4, 40.) He got out of the car, drank some more, and got into
another, inoperable car nearby, and fell asleep. (R., p.12; PSI, pp.3-4, 40.)
The reporting party called officers again to tell them the car had moved. (See R., p.12;
PSI, p.40.) Officers returned and found Mr. Goncharuk in the other car, which, they noted, was

not running. 2 (R., p.12; PSI, pp.3, 40; see also PSI, p.45 (one of the officers noting there were no
open or empty containers in the car in which Mr. Goncharuk had been sleeping).)

1

They

Citations to "PSI" refer to the electronic document "Confidential Exhibits Appeal 471282019."
2
The incident occurred in May 2018. (R., p.12.)
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requested Mr. Goncharuk perform field sobriety tests and subsequently arrested him for DUI.
(R., p.12; PSI, pp.3, 40.) They performed a breath test which confirmed that Mr. Goncharuk was
over the legal limit at that time. (R., p.12; PSI, pp.3, 40.) Later, they learned that he had two
prior felony DUI convictions from California (one from 2008 and one from 2011). (R., p.12;
PSI, p.40.) As a result, the State charged him with felony DUI. (R., pp.25-29.)
Mr. Goncharuk ultimately pled guilty to that charge and the State agreed to not pursue a
persistent violator enhancement. 3 (R., p.66.) The PSI revealed that he and his younger sisters
had moved to America from Ukraine when they were adopted following their parents' death.
(PSI, p.8.) However, they moved out when Mr. Goncharuk graduated high school, as "the stepdad" had been sexually abusing the sisters.

(PSI, p.8; see PSI, pp.9-10 (confirming that

Mr. Goncharuk graduated high schoo 1 and reporting that he attended two years at a community
college studying electrical and mechanical engineering).) Mr. Goncharuk provided for both his
sisters until they married and started their own families. (PSI, p.8.)
At that time, Mr. Goncharuk began drinking with coworkers, began expenencmg
problems with alcohol, including getting DUis. (PSI, p.8.) He explained that he had been trying
to get sober, but relapsed in 2017 and did not know how to deal with the relapse. 4 (PSI, p.11.)
The PSI author noted that Mr. Goncharuk did not have any local positive support system, and
that he reported not having engaged in a treatment program during either his prior incarceration
3

The plea agreement reads: "As to probation vs. retained jurisdiction vs. hard time prison, the
State will recommend hard time prison of three (3) years fixed prison time followed by seven (7)
years indeterminate prison time," with all other recommendations open. (R., p.66.) However, the
term "retained jurisdiction/Rider" is circled. (See R., p.66.) There was no objection at the
sentencing hearing when the prosecutor recommended the district court execute the sentence.
(See generally Tr., p.5, Ls.12-17.)
4
In this portion of the PSI, Mr. Goncharuk appears to have misspoken in regard to the date his
efforts at sobriety. (PSI, p.11 (stating his sobriety started in 2009); compare PSI, pp.5-6
(showing DUI convictions in 2010 and 2011).) Elsewhere, he put the date of his sobriety in
2013. (See PSI, pp.4, 14.)
3

or in the community. (PSI, p.14.) The GAIN evaluation gave a rule out diagnosis for alcohol
use disorder and recommended level 1 outpatient treatment. (PSI, pp.17, 21.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Goncharuk apologized for his conduct. (Tr., p.13, Ls.8-9.)
He also provided the district court with a letter indicating he had been accepted into the
River of Life inpatient treatment program. (Tr., p.8, Ls.14-22; see Exhibit, p.1.) However,
defense counsel recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction first, so as to
provide Mr. Goncharuk access to the rider program’s treatment program in addition to the River
of Life program. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-9.) She explained this would address the concerns about
Mr. Goncharuk not having structure or support when released back to the community. (Tr., p.10,
Ls.6-11.)
The district court refused to follow that recommendation because of the number of DUIs
on Mr. Goncharuk’s record and added:

“I think he’ll need significant time to achieve

rehabilitation, and rehabilitative services are now offered by the Idaho Department of
Corrections [sic].” (Tr., p.14, L.22 - p.15, L.4.) As such, it imposed and executed a unified term
of ten years, with two and one-half years fixed. (Tr., p.15, Ls.7-12.)
Mr. Goncharuk filed a pro se Rule 35 motion timely from the resulting judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.73-75.) He explained that he had been participating in several classes while
incarcerated and that he had no disciplinary actions or negative C-notes. (R., p.76.) He also took
responsibility for his actions. (R., p.76; compare PSI, p.22 (the GAIN-I noting that, at the time
of that evaluation, Mr. Gonchuark was still blaming other people and situations for his struggles
with alcohol).) In light of those efforts, he requested the district court reduce the indeterminate
portion of his sentence to three years. (R., pp.76-77.) He also requested the appointment of
counsel on his motion. (R., pp.78-80.)
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Two days later, defense counsel filed a motion for additional time, as counsel needed to
get additional documents from Mr. Goncharuk to support his motion. (R., p.93.) However, the
following day, the district court denied Mr. Goncharuk's motion without addressing counsel's
motion for additional time. (See R., pp.95-97.) It commended Mr. Goncharuk for his efforts, but
ultimately decided that did not change its initial weighing of the facts and goals of sentencing.
(R., p.97.)

Mr. Goncharuk filed a prose notice of appeal timely from the order denying his Rule 35
motion. (R., pp.101-03; see R., p.127 (the Supreme Court withdrawing an order of conditional
dismissal based on the timeliness of the notice of appeal).

ISSUES
Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Goncharuk's Rule 35 motion.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Goncharuk's Rule 35 Motion
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed to
the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe in light of new or additional
information presented to the sentencing court. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). A
district court abuses its discretion when it fails to perceive the issue as one of discretion, fails to
act within the outer boundaries of that discretion, it fails to act consistently with applicable legal
standards, or fails to reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018).

5

“The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently consider the
recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors as they were altered by the
new evidence Mr. Goncharuk presented. See id.; Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203. While the district
court may place significant weight on one of the goals of sentencing, that does not mean it can
ignore mitigating factors speaking to one of the other goals as being insignificant or unimportant.
See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006) (noting that the failure to sufficiently consider
various mitigating factors has resulted in abuses of sentencing discretion in several cases).
The new information Mr. Goncharuk provided demonstrated that he had engaged in the
treatment opportunities available in the prison, and that he did not have any disciplinary issues or
negative C-notes. (R., p.76.) “The [United States Supreme Court has] emphasized that ‘a
defendant’s disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison is itself
an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant to the sentencing determination.’” Sivak v.
State, 112 Idaho 197, 201-02 (1986) (quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 (1986)).
Mr. Goncharuk also expressly accepted responsibility for his actions for the first time. (See
R., p.76; compare PSI, p.22 (the GAIN-I concluding that, at the time of that evaluation,
Mr. Goncharuk was attributing his struggles with alcohol to “external event[s] or people”).)
Acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance of responsibility by the defendant are critical first steps
toward rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010).
The district court acknowledged his progress in these respects, but did not sufficiently
consider their impact on the appropriate sentence, as Sivak and Skipper require. Specifically, it

6

decided that Mr. Goncharuk's other characteristics and the facts of the crime meant the sentence
imposed remained appropriate. (R., p.97.)
The primary characteristic to which the district court referred was that Mr. Goncharuk
continued to present a threat to society due to his history of drinking and driving. (See Tr., p.14,
L.22 - p.15, L.4.) However, this new information revealed that Mr. Goncharuk could, with
treatment and supervision, improve his prospects of rehabilitation as a means to reduce his risk
of future DUis, and thus, long-term protection of society. This is particularly true given the
information in the record that (though the district court was skeptical of it) that Mr. Goncharuk
had not received such treatment before. (See PSI, p.14; compare Tr., p.14, L.24 - p.15, L.1.) In
other words, the new information about Mr. Goncharuk's character affected the primary point on
which the district court had based the initial sentence.
As a result, it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to say the original weighing
of his character remained the same in light of the new evidence. Essentially, that was the district
court refusing to consider that change in character as a significant factor in sentencing, even
though both Sivak and Skipper made it clear that it needed to be considered as a significant
factor. See Knighton, 143 Idaho at 320; compare State v. Black, 2018 WL 4940310, *5 (Ct. App.
2018) (remanding that case for a new sentencing hearing because, in focusing on the goal of
protecting society, the district court improperly refused to consider the defendant's mental
condition as a significant factor in mitigation). 5 The conclusion that this was an abuse of the

5

Mr. Goncharuk recognizes that unpublished decisions do not constitute precedent, and he
does not cite to Black as authority requiring a particular decision in this case. Rather, he merely
references it as a historical example of how a learned court has analyzed a similar situation.
Compare Staff of Idaho Real Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (quoting
Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 617 (1991)) ("When this Court had cause to consider
unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions because an appellant had discussed the cases in his
petition, we found the presentation of the unpublished opinions as 'quite appropriat[ e].'
7

district court's discretion is reinforced by the fact that it did not give his attorney the time she
needed to follow up on his prose motion and supplement with additional information to further
support the request for leniency. (See R., p.93 (trial counsel's motion to enlarge time on the Rule
35 motion); see generally R., pp.95-97 (the order denying the Rule 35 motion the day after the
motion to enlarge time, which does not mention the motion to enlarge time).)
Because the district court abused its discretion by not actually considering the impact of
this new information on the relevant characteristics and the goals of sentencing, this Court
should vacate that decision.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Goncharuk respectfully requests that this Court either reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate, or alternatively, vacate the order denying his Rule 35 motion and remand this case
for further proceedings.
DATED this 13 th day ofNovember, 2019.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

Likewise, we find the hearing officer's consideration of the unpublished opinion, not as binding
precedent but as an example, was appropriate.").
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13 th day of November, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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